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	 absTraCT
Aid policy and practice have been thoroughly shaken up over the past few years. 
One of the crucial reform areas relates to monitoring and evaluation (M&E). In short, aid recipi-
ents are asked to elaborate sound, results-oriented frameworks while donors are expected to 
harmonise and align their own policies and frameworks. Evidence has revealed that implemen-
tation on the ground is slow. This discussion paper examines the extent to which joint sector 
reviews (JSRs) could take the M&E reform agenda forward. JSRs are M&E exercises at the sector 
level which have the potential to satisfy the existing M&E needs of various stakeholders while, 
at the same time, also contributing to the M&E reform agenda. They are increasingly utilised on 
the ground, yet, so far, there do not exist any systematic stocktakings and/or analyses of them. 
Our own analysis of a sample of JSRs from the education sectors of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger 
indicate that JSRs score highly on harmonisation, coordination, leadership and broad-based par-
ticipation; but poorly on alignment. They generally prioritise accountability over learning needs; 
focus more on implementation than results; and largely neglect accountability and learning at 
the level of the sector institutional apparatus (including the M&E system). In this paper, findings 
from the field are contrasted with insights from evaluation theory and practice so as to provide 
suggestions for on the ground JSR improvements.
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	 résumé
Ces dernières années, la politique d’aide a été fortement bouleversée . Un des prin-
cipaux domaines de réformes se situe au niveau du “suivi et évaluation (S&E)”. En bref, les pays 
bénéficiaires doivent élaborer des systèmes S&E performants. Dans le même temps, les dona-
teurs  sont supposés  se baser et s’aligner de plus en plus sur les  systèmes et les arrangements 
nationaux de S&E. Jusqu’à présent l’implémentation sur le terrain de ces réformes est lente et 
partielle. Dans cet article, nous examinons dans quelle mesure les revues sectorielles conjointes 
(RSC) pourraient donner un coup de pouce aux réformes  dans le domaine du S&E. Les RSC sont 
des exercices de S&E au niveau  sectoriel qui sont de nature à satisfaire les besoins  de  S&E des 
différents acteurs concernés et qui en même temps,  pourraient contribuer à la réalisation des 
réformes énoncées par  la nouvelle approche de l’aide. Bien que les RSC soient de plus en  plus 
utilisées sur le terrain, il n’existe pas d’analyse systématique de leur qualité. Notre propre re-
cherche des RSCs dans les secteurs d’éducation du Burkina Faso, du Mali et du Niger montre que  
les RSCs favorisent les besoins de rendre compte au détriment de la  rétro-action, et qu’elles 
mettent plus l’accent sur l’implémentation  des interventions que sur les résultats. Elles adhè-
rent parfaitement aux  principes d’harmonisation, de coordination, de direction par les  autorités 
bénéficiaires et de large  participation  des acteurs  concernés mais elles ne s’alignent pas sur les 
systèmes S&E  sectoriels existants qu’elles négligent largement.
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1.	 InTroduCTIon
An important shift is taking place in aid to low-income countries. A growing number 
of donors is moving towards budget support where, in contrast to traditional projects, the control 
over the use of aid resources passes through the recipient government. The 2005 Paris Declara-
tion (PD) and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) are illustrations of the growing consensus 
in this respect. They set out the reform agenda for donors and recipients, and propose a monitor-
ing framework, composed of 12 indicators. One of the crucial reform areas relates to monitor-
ing and evaluation (M&E). In short, the expectations are that “partner countries endeavour to 
establish results-oriented reporting and assessment frameworks that monitor progress against 
key dimensions of the national and sector development strategies and that these frameworks 
should track a manageable number of indicators for which data are cost-effectively available” 
(indicator 11)(OECD/DAC, 2005a: 8). From donors it is expected that “they work with partner 
countries to rely, as far as possible, on partner countries’ results-oriented reporting and moni-
toring frameworks” and that they “harmonise their monitoring and reporting requirements, and, 
until they can rely more extensively on partner countries’ statistical, monitoring and evaluation 
systems, [work] with partner countries to the maximum extent possible on joint formats for pe-
riodic reporting” (OECD/DAC, 2005a: 8). Moreover, donors and partner countries jointly commit 
to “work together in a participatory approach to strengthen country capacities and demand for 
results based management” (OECD/DAC, 2005a: 8). These commitments are reconfirmed in 
the AAA. 
While the principle of recipient-led, donor-supported joint M&E is generally accept-
ed, the actual implementation of the M&E reform agenda persistently stands out as one of the 
reform areas where progress is slow. Donors still overwhelmingly rely on their own institutional 
apparatus, only harmonise slowly with other donors and hardly align with the national M&E ap-
paratus which they consider weak. Results of the 2006 Survey of the Paris Declaration highlight 
that harmonisation among donors is about 18% and 42% for donor missions and country ana-
lytical work respectively (OECD/DAC, 2007: 33-34). The percentage for donor missions would 
even be worse if joint ‘public finance management (PFM)’ missions were excluded (OECD/DAC, 
2007: 33-34). The latest 2008 PD survey does not record much progress: joint activities still 
linger around 20% for missions and 40% for country analytical work. Donor’s alignment with 
country systems for PFM and procurement has only increased marginally from 40% and 39% 
in 2005 to 45% and 43% in 2007 (OECD/DAC, 2008: 20). An earlier survey by the OECD/DAC 
furthermore revealed that by the end of 2004 on average 28% of donor project portfolio was 
monitored and evaluated through recipient’s M&E systems (OECD/DAC, 2005c). 
The recent evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration (Wood et al, 
2008) highlights that improvements in the use of countries systems are mainly in the areas of fi-
nancial management, audit and procurement, in stronger sectors and by donors that decentral-
ise their aid operations. While some donors have chosen to improve country systems by using 
them even if they are still imperfect, other donors are more reluctant to rely on country systems, 
even if they are known to be well developed. Reasons for this reluctance are related to policies 
and restrictions imposed by headquarters, remaining concerns about fiduciary risks and pres-
sures to disburse funds faster than those systems allow. 
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Donor’s worries regarding the use of recipient M&E systems are not ungrounded; 
the 2006 and 2008 PD surveys show that only 2 out of the 29 and 3 (Mozambique, Tanzania 
and Uganda) out of the 54 countries surveyed respectively had results-oriented frameworks 
that were deemed adequate (results for indicator 11)(OECD/DAC, 2007: 35; OECD/DAC, 2008: 
58-59). Nevertheless, the percentage of countries that are working to improve their monitoring 
frameworks has increased from 42% to 56% (WP-EFF, 2008). Indicator 11, which is based on the 
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) reports (see World Bank, 2007, 2005, 2003), is 
composed of three sub-components: the quality of the information available, its accessibility 
to relevant stakeholders and the existence of a co-ordinated country-level M&E system. There 
are interesting variations in the scores on the different sub-indicators with improvements in the 
area of data generation, sharing and dissemination. However, progress in establishing coher-
ent, co-ordinated and fully-functioning M&E institutions is lagging behind (see GTZ/BMZ 2004; 
World Bank 2003, 2005), even in countries where substantial improvement in sub-components 
such as statistical data capacities are made (World Bank, 2005). Similarly, the Evaluation of 
the Implementation of the Paris Declaration indicates that even though statistical reporting is 
improving in some countries, the next step, i.e. the actual use of statistical data as a basis for 
better decision-making, often remains difficult. According to the same evaluation, leadership in 
the country is a key factor in the use of information and the establishment of a quality system 
(Wood et al, 2008). 
Donors and recipients are obviously caught in a kind of chicken-and-egg dilemma. 
Donors are not eager to align with systems that are at best only partially developed while the 
elaboration and maturing of recipient systems is blocked by the same donor reluctance to align. 
In order to move beyond this current catch-22 situation, reasonable and pragmatic approaches 
are needed. One possible scenario is to adopt a two-track approach that combines the set-up 
and/or strengthening of recipient M&E systems with the fulfilment of the existing M&E needs 
in the short and middle term. As in most cases the current recipient M&E system is not yet able 
to satisfy the existing M&E needs of accountability and learning, there is a need for comple-
mentary M&E exercises. The quality of such exercises and more particularly the degree to which 
they are able to cope with the recipient and donor M&E demands is crucial to convince donors to 
lower down their own separate stand-alone M&E exercises. At the same time, complementary 
exercises should be set up in such a way that they feed as much as possible into the M&E re-
form agenda of harmonisation, alignment, ownership and building of the recipient M&E system. 
The maturing recipient M&E system can then progressively accommodate the M&E needs, with 
complementary exercises gradually evolving towards a kind of meta-evaluation. 
So far, there are no clear-cut recipes provided by M&E theory or longstanding simi-
lar M&E practices for the design of such complementary M&E exercises. At best, evaluation 
literature and practice inform us that the challenges at stake are huge. Nevertheless and by 
necessity, on the ground, various stakeholders involved seek solutions to the challenges con-
fronted with. One such strand of ongoing M&E exercises are Joint Sector Reviews (JSRs). JSRs 
are increasingly included as essential ingredients in Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps), and in 
processes linked to sectoral and general budget support. JSRs are gradually functioning as the 
main instrument for assessing progress, resolving issues and reaching agreement on the sector 
policy, programme and targets and increasingly and progressively replace individual supervi-
sion missions of donor agencies (World Bank, 2001). 
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In spite of the increasing prevalence and importance of these processes on the 
ground, there has so far been little systematic review of JSRs that is taking stock of experienc-
es, analyses strengths and weaknesses and formulates suggestions for improvement (see also 
Packer, 2006). This research aims at filling this gap. In doing so, we assess a sample of JSRs in 
the education sectors of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger on a number of criteria. Additionally, we 
confront research findings with insights from evaluation theory and practice in order to provide 
some suggestions for improvement of JSRs. In short, our study follows the longstanding tradi-
tion of cross-fertilisation among M&E experiments in aid monitoring and evaluation practice on 
the one hand and the methodological insights from evaluation theory and practice on the other 
hand[1].  
The structure of this discussion paper is as follows: chapter two presents the con-
ceptual framework, chapter three provides data, methodology and setting, chapter four sum-
marises selected findings for JSRs in three selected countries, chapter five broadens the discus-
sion to a number of key issues that may be distilled from the findings and finally chapter six 
concludes.
[1]  See Cracknell B.E. (2000). 
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2.	 ConCepTual	framework
JSRs have their origin in SWAps. In a context of changing aid modalities, SWAps are 
used by partner countries and donors to channel aid to a specific sector. SWAps are most com-
mon in the health and education sector. Foster (2000) defines the characteristics of a SWAp as: 
“all significant funding for the sector supports a single sector policy and expenditure programme, 
under government leadership, adopting common approaches across the sector, and progressing 
towards relying on government procedures to disburse and account for all funds” (Foster, 2000: 
9). Central to a SWAp is the collective responsibility of donors and governments for achieve-
ments in the sector. Different than in project aid, donors are not able to attribute their financial 
inputs to specific outputs; they have to justify their individual contributions in terms of progress 
against jointly agreed objectives in the sector (Cassels, 1997). Therefore, within the SWAp the 
need for joint assessment instruments has emerged. 
Besides JSRs, joint evaluations, i.e. evaluations to which different donor agencies 
and/or partners participate (OECD/DAC, 2002), could be used for the assessment of perform-
ance in a sector. While the advantages of joint evaluations, such as harmonization and reduced 
transaction costs, are clear, in practice, joint evaluations are not yet common practice. In the 
OECD/DAC guidance for managing joint evaluations (2006:12) two challenges for effective joint 
evaluations are identified: 
• “Subjects that are especially suited to joint evaluations – such as co-financed pro-
gramme support at the budget or sector level, multilateral agency effectiveness and evaluat-
ing the impact of several actors – are more difficult to evaluate than traditional single agency 
projects.
• Processes for coordinating joint work can be complex and can increase the cost and 
duration of the evaluation” 
Recent examples of joint evaluations are the evaluation of General Budget Support 
(IDD and Associates, 2006) and the evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration 
(Wood et al, 2008).  
Even though JSRs are commonplace in SWAps, so far no standard definition, hand-
books or blueprints for JSR exist. A review, defined by the OECD/DAC (2002: 34) as “an assess-
ment of the performance of an intervention, periodically or an ad hoc basis”, may be considered 
an instrument which is situated between monitoring[1] and evaluation[2]. While data provided 
in monitoring does not give insight in causes and attribution of change, the assessment in a 
review is less comprehensive and in depth than an evaluation and emphasizes operational as-
pects (OECD/DAC, 2002). Thus, a JSR may be described as a type of joint periodic assessment 
of performance in a specific sector with the aim to satisfy donor and recipient’s accountability 
and learning needs. ‘Performance’ is to be interpreted broadly and may include both a focus on 
substance at various levels (inputs, activities, output, outcome and impact) as well as on the 
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A number of objectives of joint reviews are listed by Packer (2006: 2):
-  Increase country ownership
-  Give more effective support to national priorities
-  Promote more efficient division of labour among aid agencies
-  Improve frameworks for monitoring and evaluation
-  Improve accountability to funding sources and government partners
-  Improve efficiency and transparency through harmonized monitoring and
  evaluation systems
-  Improve the aggregate effectiveness of aid. 
Packer adds that there has not been any systematic comparative analysis to find 
out whether joint reviews on the ground actually (partly) meet these objectives.
In most cases JSRs are organized once or twice a year and take about one to two 
weeks. They are led and coordinated by the sector ministry, often in cooperation with the lead 
donor in the sector. JSRs engage a broad range of state and non-state stakeholders who are sub-
divided over several working groups which focus on specific topics (such as quantity and quality 
of outputs and outcomes, public finance management, human resources, management informa-
tion system). The documentary input into JSRs diverges from country to country and includes at 
best a combination of various primary and secondary data sources. In most of the cases a sector 
performance report has been prepared by the sector ministry, including as well financial report-
ing from the finance department or the Ministry of Finance (and/ or sector finance departments). 
This is at times combined with additional (commissioned) studies on specific topics that were 
identified during previous JSRs and information from ‘project’ donors or civil society organisa-
tions active in the sector. Sometimes field missions are also planned during the JSR. Evidence 
from all these sources feeds into discussions in several technical working groups. Conclusions 
and recommendations from these discussions are mostly brought together at the Annual Review 
Meeting (ARM) where they are shared with all stakeholders. The Aide Mémoire (AM) is the main 
documentary output of the JSR. 
Because there exist no clear-cut guidelines or specific criteria for JSR, which could 
function as the basis for a review exercise, selection of issues for analysis has mainly been driven 
by our research question, i.e. the extent to which JSRs satisfy existing M&E needs of account-
ability, learning and are in accordance with the reform agenda of the Paris Declaration. Addition-
ally, we have also consulted guidelines that exist for evaluation exercises in general and joint 
exercises in particular (OECD/DAC, 1991; 1998; 2000; 2005b) and we have reviewed the 1997 
WHO/UNDP guide on SWAPs as well (Cassels, 1997). This resulted in the following framework 
of analysis. 
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Table 1:   Framework of Analysis
Broad objectives Specific Issues
I. Accountability needs  How and to what extent does the JSR cover accountability at the level of:
-  substance at aggregate sectoral level 
  •  sector inputs (financial and human resources, quality of  policy)
  •   sectoral activities and outputs (quantity and quality of schooling,
    effectiveness, cost-effectiveness)
  •   outcomes and impact (utilization, inequality in utilization, literacy)
-   elaboration and functioning of the institutional apparatus at the aggregate sector  
level
Learning needs How and to what extent does the JSR address learning related to:
- substance at the sectoral level
  •   linkages among inputs – activities 
  •   linkages among activities – outputs 
  •   linkages among outputs – outcomes – impact 
- operational apparatus at the overall sectoral level 
Reform agenda How and to what extent does the JSR promote the PD reform agenda?
-   harmonization/coordination at sectoral level (including among  various types of  
  donors at sectoral level) 
-   harmonization/coordination with national (PRSP) review processes & PAF 
-   alignment with the existing sector M&E frameworks 
  •  use of information from the existing M&E system, from  the routine data 
    collection, the MIS
-   country leadership/ownership
-   broad participation of inside & outside government actors 
-   capacity building of the M&E supply & demand side 
  •   line ministry
     civil society, universities, M&E networks, parliament, audit  offices 
-  mutual accountability
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3.	 daTa,	meThodology	and	seTTIng
3.1.  Data and Methodology 
 
The selection of the sample of JSRs has been guided by a number of criteria. First-
ly, the research is in the context of Belgian development cooperation, thus we selected JSRs 
in which Belgium participated. Secondly, as new aid modalities emphasize the incremental im-
provement of programmes and processes, we have selected our sample with a view to including 
a longitudinal perspective. Thirdly, we have tried to balance between internal and external va-
lidity[1], with a slight preference for internal validity as there does not exist much prior research 
on the same topic. Therefore, we have concentrated on one sector and on similar countries. In 
order to increase at the same time external validity as much as possible, we have included more 
than one country and selected the sector where Belgium focuses on most prominently in the 
context of sector support. The combination of all these criteria has finally led to a selection of 
JSRs in the education sectors of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Our research results are mainly 
applicable to the sample selected, but the more general findings and discussion are interesting 
for other sectors and other countries as well. 
In order to increase the construct validity[2] of our findings we have opted for a com-
bination of a desk and field study. Our desk study includes a review of the Aide Mémoires, i.e. 
the main ‘written’ output of the JSRs, according to a number of specific criteria. Additionally, we 
have participated on the ground in one JSR mission and ARM. This provided us with an opportu-
nity to become better acquainted with the process and to interact with several of the stakehold-
ers that took part in the JSR. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the specific JSR exercises that were included in the desk 
study. Field study has been done in the framework of the 9th JSR of the education sector of 
Burkina Faso (10-16 April 2007).
Table 2:   Identifying the sample 
Country  Sector programme   Specific JSRs
Burkina Faso  Plan Décennal de Développement 
de l’Education de Base (PDDEB)
2003, 2004, May/June 2005, Dec. 2005, 
April/May 2006, Nov. 2006, April 2007,
Nov. 2007
Mali  Programme d’Investissement 
Sectoriel en Education (PISE)
2002, January 2003, June 2003, 2004, 2007
Niger  Programme Décennal de Dévelop-
pement de l’Education (PDDE)
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3.2.  The setting 
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger are among the poorest countries in the world, rank-
ing 176, 173th, 174th respectively (out of 177 countries with data) on the Human Development 
Index (UNDP, 2007). The three countries are included in the 2006 and 2008 surveys of the Paris 
Declaration (PD). The table below summarises the scores on the PD-indicators. 
Table 3:  Results on some of the indicators of the Paris Declaration for 2006 and 2008
Burkina Faso Mali Niger Global (a)
2006 2008 2006 2008 2006 2008 2006 2008
Aid reported in the survey (USD m) 593 827 625 811 393 428
Indicator 1:
Operational development strategy (b)








Reliability of PFM systems (c)













government budget estimates (%)
68 92 60 73 99 91 42 48
Indicator 4:
Co-ordinated TA (%)
3 56 15 75 15 45 48 60
Indicator 5a: 
Aid using country systems, PFM (%)
45 43 29 34 27 26 40 45
Indicator 5b: 
Aid using country systems,
procurement (%)
60 54 45 35 49 37 39 43
Indicator 6:
Parallel PIUs
131 102 65 60 52 47 1.817 1.601
Indicator 7:
Disbursements on schedule (%)
92 92 71 68 73 78 41 46
Indicator 8:
Untied bilateral aid (%)
92 92 95 93 84 84 82 87
Indicator 9: 
Programme based aid (%)
45 57 48 41 31 49 43 46
Indicator 10a:
Co-ordinated mission (%)
17 13 7 15 21 15 18 20
Indicator 10b:
Co-ordinated country analysis (%) *
39 39 26 39 35 32 42 42
Indicator 11:
Monitorable PAF (d)








Mutual accountability (no countries)
No no no No no no 12  13
*  There are differences in the scores for 2006 when comparing the 2006 and 2008 reports. The percentages represented here are those  
  from the 2008 report. The percentages mentioned in the 2006 report are 45, 30 and 40 respectively.
a  Global score of countries participating in both 2006 and 2008 survey
b  There are 5 scores from A to E, with A meaning that the National Development Strategy substantially achieves good practice
  and E meaning that the National Development Strategy reflects little action toward achieving good practice.
c  These are CPIA ratings[1] varying between 1.0 (very weak), and 6.0 (very strong), with 2.0 (weak), 3.0 (moderately weak), 
  4 (moderately strong) and 5.0 (strong).
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The table shows a mixed picture, with generally slightly better scores for Burkina 
Faso than for Mali and Niger. Burkina Faso improved the score for indicator 1 from C to B thanks 
to the establishment of a strategic framework for development with clear priorities and the in-
troduction of a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) (OECD/DAC, 2008: 30). How-
ever, findings demonstrate at the same time that in Burkina Faso and Niger the scores for the 
indicators in the areas of harmonisation (10a and 10b) and alignment (5a and 5b) decreased or 
remained the same between the 2006 and 2008 survey. Even though Mali improved its status 
on indicators 5a, 10a and 10b (decrease in score 5b), its scores are still behind those of Burkina 
Faso and the global scores. 
Scores on indicator 11 highlight that none of the three countries has an adequate 
results orientated framework and no improvements over time are observed. CDF reports, on 
which the scores of indicator 11 are based, provide more detailed information on the three sub-
indicators (i.e. the quality of the available information, its accessibility to relevant stakeholders 
and the existence of a co-ordinated country-level M&E system). According to the LEADS[1]-scor-
ing method, Burkina Faso has taken action on all three dimensions of an M&E system (score ‘A’). 
Mali and Niger score similarly on ‘coordinated country-level M&E’ while both obtain a lower 
score (‘E’; elements exist) for ‘quality of development information’ and ‘stakeholders access to 
information.
The JSRs under study are all related to the education sector of Burkina Faso, Mali 
and Niger. In what follows we present selected data on sector performance and aid as well as a 
short overview of the education policies in the three countries. 
The (net) enrolment rates for primary, secondary and tertiary education of Burkina 
Faso, Mali and Niger are lower than the average rates of countries in Sub Sahara Africa in 2006. 
Mali shows a slightly better score on primary education than Burkina Faso and Niger (no data for 
Mali on secondary and tertiary education), due to remarkable improvements in the last decade 
(see table 4). 





Burkina	Faso T 27 47
M  33 52
F 21 42
Mali T 25 61
M 31 67
F 18 54
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The three countries also score below average on the literacy rates (adult 15+, aver-
age is 62.1: 71.0 male, 53.7 female), with the lowest rate for Mali: 22.9 in 2006 (31.1 male, 15.6 
female). The literacy rates for Burkina Faso and Niger stand at 26.0 (34.3 male, 17.9 female) and 
29.8 (43.8 male, 15.8 female) respectively.
These figures demonstrate that the challenges for these countries to reach the edu-
cation related Millennium Development Goals (MDG)[1] are huge. However, all three countries 
have developed specific education plans[2] aimed at attaining them by 2015. These plans are 
quite similar: all consist of three components: improvement of access, improvement of quality 
and strengthening of the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Education. In order to attain 
the objectives formulated in these plans, substantial investments are needed. Table 5 gives an 
overview of the public expenditures that are currently being targeted to the education sector. 
Besides striking similarities in plans and policies, the relative budgetary allocation to the edu-
cation sector as well as the division over the different sub-sectors is highly similar in the three 
countries. 
Table 5:  Public expenditure on education in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, 2006
Burkina Faso Mali  Niger
Public expenditure on education
as % of GDP 4.2 4.5 3.4
as % of total government expenditure 15.4 16.8 17.6
Distribution of public expenditure per level (%)
Primary 66 60 64
Secondary 21 27 25
Tertiary 11 12 11
Source: http://stats.uis.unesco.org
Aid to the education sector is highest in Burkina Faso (i.e. 153 million USD in 2005 
of which 56.9% for basic education or 39 USD per primary school-age child). The correspond-
ing figures for Mali are 74 million USD (50.0 % and 16 USD), and 80 million USD ( 61.3% and 21 
USD) for Niger. The share of education in total ODA is 16% in Burkina Faso, 8% in Mali and 12% 
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4.		 fIndIngs
The first JSRs in the education sectors in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger took place 
in 2003, 2002 and 2003 respectively. The JSRs in Mali and Niger are annual, the JSR in Burkina 
Faso is organised twice a year. There were no JSRs during the preparation of the new education 
programme in Mali. In all three countries an explicit JSR objective is to assess the execution of 
the education programme in the past (half) year (focus on accountability). In the JSRs of Burkina 
Faso and Niger another explicit objective is to provide recommendations for the improvement of 
the execution of the programme in the coming (half) year (focus on learning). This prospective 
objective was included as well in the first JSR in Mali, but in the subsequent JSRs, this element 
was left out. In spite of the absence of a clear mentioning of the ‘learning’ objective, recommen-
dations for better performance were also formulated in the Aide Mémoires of all JSRs in Mali. 
For the assessment of the JSRs the framework of analysis described in section two 
is used. Below, an overview of selected findings for the three countries is presented, subdivided 
over accountability needs, learning needs and the Paris reform agenda. Throughout the discus-
sion we draw upon examples from the different countries. There is a bias towards the case of 
Burkina Faso where more JSRs took place so far and where desk study was complemented with 
field study. 
4.1.  Accountability needs
Table 6:  Accountability needs in the JSR
Burkina Faso Mali Niger
Substance - Focus mainly on access and quality.
- Since the 6th mission (Nov. 2006) 
more attention to financial inputs 
through the instalment of a working 
group on financial management.
- Focus on access and 
quality with main em-
phasis on accountabil-
ity at the activity level. 
Only one AM contains 
progress on (mainly) 
output indicators.
- In most AMs little atten-
tion for financial inputs. 
- Focus on access and 
quality with main em-
phasis on accountability 
at the activity level.
- Accountability at the 
financial input level is 
becoming increasingly 
important (particularly 




- In the AMs especially attention for 
financial management and capacity 
building and not really for institu-
tional and systemic issues at other 
levels of the causal chain. 
- Since the 6th and 7th JSR 
(2006/2007) increasing awareness 
of the importance of the underlying 
systemic and institutional issues, 
without much follow-up however. 
- Relatively little atten-
tion to institutional and 
systemic issues (except 
for the 2nd AM). 
- Not much attention 
to M&E at central and 
programme level. 
- Increasing attention to 
institutional develop-
ment, mainly caused 
by findings on lagging 
improvements at the 
substance level. 
Table 6 summarizes the findings regarding the coverage of accountability needs in 
the JSRs. Generally there is more attention during the JSRs for accountability than for learning 
needs, which is obvious from the emphasis put on performance stocktaking. Accountability is 
mainly oriented towards issues of substance and there is a predominance of ‘implementation’ 
over ‘results’, and more particularly a focus on the rate of execution of the planned activities 
(such as building of classrooms and recruitment of teachers). 
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The importance given to particular topics during the JSRs is mainly related to the 
existence of thematic working groups on the specific topic. The 5th JSR in Burkina Faso pays e.g. 
much attention to infrastructure and curricula, which corresponds to the existence of working 
groups on these subjects. From the 6th JSR onwards, a specific working group on financial man-
agement has been installed, which has put PFM issues higher on the agenda.
Progress in the set-up and functioning of the sectoral M&E system is nowhere a ma-
jor issue during the JSRs. The attention for institutional and systemic issues is however gradually 
increasing as a result of continuous disappointing achievements at the substance level. This is 
particularly the case in Niger, where the implementation of the new education programme was 
seriously delayed due to a reorganisation/decentralisation of the Ministry of Education. Increas-
ing attention to systemic issues does not necessarily equate to substantial improvements as 
recommendations which are formulated during one JSR are not necessarily pursued during the 
next. This is particularly true for recommendations regarding the more difficult to grasp and sen-
sitive institutional and systemic issues. The ToR of the 9th mission of Burkina Faso acknowledge 
this issue and provide instructions for the formulation of recommendations: each chapter of the 
Aide Mémoire is allowed to have a maximum of four recommendations, which should be able to 
be operationalised within six months. Furthermore, recommendations related to institutional 
and systemic issues should be operationalised by a technical recommendation. 
4.2.  Learning Needs
Table 7:   Learning needs in the JSR
Burkina Faso Mali Niger
Substance - In objectives of latest JSRs more 
attention to learning needs.
- Analyses are weak but improving 
over time.  
- Hardly any analyses are 
made. 
- The JSR concludes that 
the sector performance 
reports (major input of 
JSR) contain no analyses 
concerning the progress 
of the indicators, which 
makes it difficult to learn. 
- Analysis focuses mainly 
on implementation 
issues, mostly on issues 





- Almost each AM contains recom-
mendations related to M&E (for 
the overall sector level and for the 
programme level), but follow up is 
lacking.
- Increasing attention to the 
improvement of the quality of the 
reporting (implementation reports, 
AMs and recommendations).
- Analysis and learning 
regarding the institu-
tional/systemic issues is 
not on the agenda of the 
JSRs.
- Recommendations are 
made in every JSR, but 
without results. Prob-
lems are mainly situated 
at the level of budgeting 
and planning. 
Table 7 provides an overview of the coverage of learning needs in the JSRs. The 
minimal attention given to learning during JSRs is clearly due to a lack of analysis regarding the 
(non)-achievement of the performance targets set. When analyses are included, they are often 
of poor quality but improving gradually over time, particularly in Burkina Faso. However, even 
in the most recent Aide Mémoire of Burkina Faso, analyses are still mainly phrased in terms of 
statements or recommendations. 
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Generally, the analytical depth of the JSR largely depends upon the analytical qual-
ity of the sectoral performance report, the major documentary input provided by the ministry 
of education. In all three countries the low analytical quality of the performance reports is ac-
knowledged and over time the quality of the reports has been improved in Burkina Faso and 
Niger. Interestingly, the AMs of Mali and Niger recognise the value added of field missions for 
the improvement of the analytical depth of performance reports.
Similar to the coverage of accountability needs, analysis and learning is also pre-
dominantly centred on the ‘service utilisation plan’ (relationship between activities and out-
puts). When there is attention for progress in the elaboration and functioning of the underlying 
institutional apparatus, it is mainly related to Public Finance Management (PFM) issues.
4.3.  Paris Reform Agenda
Table 8:   Paris reform agenda and the JSR
Burkina Faso Mali Niger
Coordination and 
Harmonisation at 
sector level  
- Coordination and harmonisation  is 
taking place through the ‘Cadre 
Partenarial’. 
- Especially in the 2nd AM 
attention to the non-har-
monisation of procedures of 
the different development 
partners
- Attention to harmonisa-






- Indicators are harmonised with those 
of the PRSP. 
- Overlap of actors that participate at 
various processes.
- Harmonisation with the 
central PRSP process is an 
explicit objective (see first 
AM).
- The education programme 
is integrated in the PRSP 
and in conformity with the 
MDGs. 
Alignment - There is alignment on paper in the 
‘Cadre Partenarial’. The move towards 
alignment and budget support is 
however weakened in the final version 
of the ‘cadre partenarial’. 
The effective degree of alignment is 
not clear. 
- The degree of alignment 
is not clear from the docu-
ments.
- The M&E unit plays a role 
in alignment of information, 
including information from 
projects and programmes. 
Leadership/
ownership
- Joint coordination and joint presiden-
cy of Secretary General of the ministry 
of education and the leading donor. 
- Ownership/leadership is 
not clear from the docu-
ments.
- The Ministry of basic 
education coordinates 
the education programme 




- The first AM mentions explicitly the 
presence of the ministry of education, 
donors in the education sector, social 
partners (labour union, teacher-par-
ents associations), NGOs, private 
sector, representatives of other 
ministries (without further detail) 
and representatives of the deconcen-
trated structures.
- Representatives of the 
national ministry of educa-
tion, development partners, 
deconcentrated and decen-
tralised structures and civil 
society. Not clear whether 
the ministry of finance or 
the central M&E unit are 
present. 
- Many donors are present, 
also non-budget support 
donors. Representatives of 
the Ministry of Finance and 




demand & supply 
side
- Weak capacity is acknowledged, but 
no specific capacity building in  M&E. 
- Only attention in 2nd AM 
to capacity building in 
M&E for the decentralised 
‘education’ structures at 
local level. 
- No specific attention to 
capacity building at the 
level of M&E. 
Mutual account-
ability 
- Donor effectiveness not really an 
issue on the agenda. 
- Little and in the last two 
AMs even no attention to 
donor effectiveness 
- AM increasingly critical on 
the fulfilment by donors of 
agreements made in the 
‘Cadre Partenarial’. 
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Table 8 summarises the findings related to the Paris reform agenda. When it comes 
to the implementation of the Paris reform agenda, there is clearly more progress in coordination 
and harmonisation than alignment. There are efforts to harmonise sector review processes with 
central PRSP review processes in order to avoid the continuous existence of parallel processes. 
In practice, this is achieved through the use of similar indicators and the participation of key-ac-
tors of the central review processes (mostly from the ministry of finance) in sectoral review proc-
esses. The harmonisation and coordination among various types of donors at the sectoral level 
is a topic of discussion during JSRs. Whereas coordination is certainly not yet optimal, progress 
is being made. A first important step is obviously the participation in the JSRs of non-budget 
support donors who have projects in the education sector. 
In line with the above-mentioned limited discussion regarding the systemic and in-
stitutional issues during the JSRs and the lack of specific performance targets and systematic 
follow-up in this area, the actual degree of alignment with the sectoral M&E system is low or at 
least not always clear from the JSR. Similarly, capacity building of the M&E supply and demand 
side does not seem to figure prominently on the agenda of the JSR. From these findings it is obvi-
ous that the use of the JSR as an instrument to feed into the elaboration and the maturing of the 
own national sector M&E system remains largely underexploited. There is no real systematic 
diagnosis of the existing M&E system or arrangements, little effective target setting regarding 
areas for improvement, no follow-up of recommendations, no straightforward capacity building 
plan and (consequently) little effective donor alignment. Reversely, leadership and broad-based 
participation seem to score relatively well: in all cases the ministry of education takes the lead 
in the JSR, alone or jointly with the sector lead donor and various groups of stakeholders, both 
from within and outside government, participate in the JSR. Participation is enhanced through 
the organisation of discussions in different working groups which are composed of various ac-
tors. 
While JSRs are mentioned in the evaluation of the implementation of the Paris 
Declaration (Wood et al, 2008) as one of the mechanisms for mutual assessment of progress, 
donor’s effectiveness in terms of providing financial and human inputs is not on the agenda of 
the JSRs studied, except in the case of Niger where donors’ fulfilment of the agreements made 
in the ‘Cadre Partenariat’ is increasingly critically assessed. Reports of consultants are much 
more critical on the partnership between donors and government. For instance, a consultant of 
the Belgian Technical Cooperation wrote in his report on the 5th JSR in Burkina Faso: ‘L’absence 
d’un vrai “partenariat” entre MEBA (Ministry of Health) et PTF (donors) était assez visible: les 
PTF posaient des questions critiques et le MEBA répondait; la présence de volonté de chercher 
des solutions ensemble n’était pas très apparente.’ In his review of JSRs in the education sec-
tors of Ethiopia, India and Rwanda, Packer (2006) similarly highlighted that the degree to which 
donor’s accountability was tackled during the JSRs was not clear. 
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5.	 Issues	for	dIsCussIon
Confronting the research findings with insights from evaluation theory and practice raises 
a number of issues for broader discussion and from which we might learn to improve actual JSR practices 
on the ground. We have structured the discussion according to four major items: 
-  the balance between ‘substance’ and ‘institutional/ systemic issues’
-  the balance between ‘accountability’ and ‘learning’
-  the JSR as a forum for harmonisation and cooperation
-  the JSR and feedback
5.1.   Balancing ‘substance’ and ‘systemic’ issues 
Our review highlights that so far JSRs overwhelmingly focus on ‘substance’ issues 
while they largely neglect the deeper-rooted institutional and systemic issues. The focus on per-
formance ‘stock’ measurement is understandable given the existing short-term M&E needs. The 
disregard of systemic issues, however, runs counter to the logic of the new aid modalities. These 
endorse a shift from ‘content’ to ‘process’, hereby expecting that process conditionality, with 
in particular attention to reforms in the area of public expenditure accounting, budget reform 
and public service management, will lead to greater national ownership and commitment for 
poverty reduction policies and programmes (see Booth, 2003). The negligence of systemic issues 
neither matches the growing understanding of the importance of institutional capacity for a suc-
cessful implementation of sector-wide approaches. Cassels (1997), for instance, has stressed the 
importance of government capacity to lead the process of sectoral development and to facilitate 
the introduction of common management arrangements (see Cassels, 1997). 
While the need to focus on systemic issues is progressively recognised in the JSRs of 
particularly Niger and Burkina Faso, none of these explicitly integrates the elaboration, strength-
ening, follow-up of the underlying apparatus for policy-making, implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation among its objectives and targets. This is certainly not unique to the countries 
or sectors under study. While weaknesses in particularly monitoring and evaluation have been 
identified by Dfid as the most fundamental threat to the sustainability of the sector-wide ap-
proach (Grindle, page cited in World Bank, 2001: 27), the development of M&E systems generally 
remains weak in the development of sector programmes (Jones, cited in World Bank, 2001 : 27). 
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It entails a long-term approach[1] with sound diagnosis of M&E demand and supply side, target 
setting, capacity building and follow-up demanding considerable time and financial resources 
(Feinstein and Ingram, 2003). Given that M&E system and capacity building is not a-stroke-of-
the-pen undertaking, and taking into account the existing M&E accountability and learning 
needs, alignment with M&E systems will necessarily be incremental. As Foster (2000: 30) puts 
it, ‘the presentational risks from too rapid a reliance on government systems can be high: lack of 
capacity may lead to a dip in disbursements, or exposure of major fraud or mismanagement may 
lead to a reversal of progress’. Nevertheless, there is an important role for ‘path-finder’ donors 
willing to develop procedures and systems and then test them by daring to put money through 
them’ (Foster, 2000: 31). Refraining from investing in ‘systemic’ issues risks to boost parallel 
M&E processes and to undermine the M&E reform agenda.
JSRs that invest in the set-up of sector M&E systems and capacity-building would, 
over time, also benefit from higher-quality sector performance reports. These are among the 
main documentary inputs into the JSR and their quality largely determines the overall quality 
of the JSR. Investing in maturing sector M&E systems would gradually shift the essence of a 
JSR away from ‘substance’ assessment and learning to more systemic evaluation exercises and 
formative and summative meta-evaluations which focus on the quality of the sector’s M&E sys-
tems and their main outputs. In systemic evaluative exercises the functioning of the whole sys-
tem for supplying reliable evaluative information is assessed (see Schartz and Mayne, 2005). A 
meta-evaluation is a method to analyse and assess the quality of evaluations (Bustelo, 2003) 
and/or evaluation systems. Two types of meta-evaluation can be distinguished. Formative meta-
evaluation is pro-active and particularly helpful in improving ongoing evaluation work (Stuffle-
beam, 1974). It can be used to identify strengths and weaknesses in evaluation practice (includ-
ing M&E systems) in order to develop evaluation capacity (Leeuw en Cooksy, 2004). On the other 
hand summative meta-evaluations are more retroactive and mainly serve accountability (Stuf-
flebeam, 1974). Reasons for doing a summative meta-evaluation include informing stakehold-
ers’ decisions about whether and how to use evaluation findings and helping evaluators’ and 
researchers’ to select evaluation findings for evaluation syntheses (Leeuw en Cooksy, 2004). In 
order to ensure objectivity and quality, meta-evaluations are usually performed on the basis of 
evaluation standards[2].
A practice that might be particularly valuable for M&E institutional capacity build-
ing is ‘twinning’, whereby linkages are created between institutions with similar functions but 
with different levels of development. Contrary to more traditional technical assistance which 
is more based on individual capacity building, twinning focuses more on the development of 
organizations and institutions. Activities generally used in twinning arrangements are formal 
off-job training courses, in-house training courses, on-job training and study visits. In order to 
really fulfil the aim of institutional capacity building, partners should be carefully chosen and 
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As JSRs involve a broad range of actors, both from within and outside government, 
M&E capacity building should not only be confined to the traditional M&E supply side actors. 
When M&E capacity building becomes one of the explicit objectives of JSRs, M&E demand side 
actors outside government may also benefit. This will eventually contribute towards ‘downward 
accountability’ whereby national non-government actors hold their own government account-
able.
5.2.   Balancing ‘accountability’ and ‘learning’ 
While it is not always explicitly stated in these terms, JSRs strive to satisfy an odd 
mixture of accountability and learning needs, mostly with an inclination towards accountability. 
There are contributions to evaluation literature indicating that it is preferable to unite both func-
tions. Perrin (2002), for instance, suggests that a limited focus on accountability and perform-
ance targets is useless in providing future directions as it leads to manipulation of data. This 
has also been evidenced off in the case of JSRs where governments have tried to keep negative 
comments out of the reports, hereby undermining the confidence of donors in the process and 
reinforcing the tendency to stick to existing parallel M&E channels (see Brown et al., 2001). In-
stead, Perrin proposes an alternative framework for accountability in which programmes should 
not be held accountable for exactly executing what was planned, but for demonstrating that 
they are focused on outcomes and that they take a learning approach. Lehtonen (2005) indicates 
that there might be some ways to reconcile both functions, but he nevertheless concludes that 
one primary function and main client should be identified for each evaluation exercise. 
Generally, standard evaluation theory and practice suggest that exercises that blur 
the distinction between accountability and learning run the risk of falling short in both areas, 
because more often than not different functions necessitate the involvement of different actors, 
a different focus and the use of different methodologies. Although there is some overlap in audi-
ence, the primary audience for accountability are media and civil society organisations in donor 
and recipient countries, parliament and national audit offices in donor countries, senior man-
agement within the international agency and the partner government. On the other hand, the 
primary audience for learning are government departments, development agencies and senior 
management, policy units and operational departments within the international agency in donor 
countries and in-country staff within the international agency, operational staff in other devel-
opment agencies, counterparts involved in implementing programmes and policy makers in gov-
ernment and other in-country organisations in recipient countries (OECD/DAC, 2001). A different 
audience needs a different approach, with more emphasis on rigour, independence, replicability 
and efficiency in the case of accountability and more focus on the process in the case of learning, 
whereby space is needed for discussion of experience and lessons learned (OECD/DAC, 2001). 
Additionally, accountability exercises demand careful scientific preparation. In or-
der to be able to extrapolate findings from a limited sample, for instance, one needs to increase 
as much as possible the external validity of the assessment. Concretely, this implies that sam-
ples need to be representative. Failing to respect this weakens the credibility of the assessment 
and gives the implementing agency under scrutiny every excuse to downplay or flatly ignore 
‘negative’ findings. On the other hand, ‘learning’ necessitates zooming into and analyzing unex-
pected results, success stories, failures or specific experiments, for instance in the way services 
are delivered. Here external validity is obviously not a concern, on the contrary; internal validity 
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should be optimized, so as to make credible conclusions regarding causal linkages of the under-
lying programme theory. In order to identify issues under study and to ensure that feedback for 
future policy-making and management is optimal, one obviously needs to involve those respon-
sible for policy and programme design and implementation. So far, the analytical quality of the 
JSRs is particularly low, which is obviously related to the above- mentioned lack of sector evalu-
ative capacity. That the usefulness of these ‘learning’ exercises potentially extends beyond the 
particular programme, sector, or even country setting, even though the costs of such ‘evaluative 
exercises’ are substantial, justifies heavy donor (financial) investment in the building of recipi-
ent evaluative capacity and systems. The shift towards more joint ‘evaluative’ exercises in the 
context of sector and general budget support is particularly promising in this respect as it might 
lower the public goods problem that also exists among donor agencies when it comes to impact 
evaluation (Centre for Global Development, 2006). 
Keeping in mind the tensions that might exist among ‘accountability’ and ‘learning’, 
it might be worth splitting JSRs into two separate exercises or adopt a kind of hybrid multi-part-
ner approach[1] where not all stakeholders participate similarly in all dimensions and phases 
of the joint review exercise. If one wants to do a reality check on government’s performance, 
for instance, then obviously there is a need to respect as much as possible the principle of au-
tonomy and independence which implies the involvement of independent actors on the demand 
side, such as the auditor general’s office, independent policy research institutes and independ-
ent CSOs. One could even argue that donors (or at least some departments in donor agencies) 
are themselves not independent enough to be involved in these accountability exercises[2]. The 
involvement of national independent actors in ‘accountability’ exercises may at the same time 
also function as a kind of learning-by-doing approach to build national evaluative capacity. 
Those in favour of one exercise to cover both accountability and learning needs 
consider the use of one system as a way to tackle the limitations of the current move towards 
narrowly confined performance measurement (PM) systems to satisfy accountability needs. 
Criticism is related to different issues such as the organisational and systemic side-effects in-
cluding organisational paralysis, ‘tunnel’ vision, ‘goal displacement’, the construct validity of 
performance indicators, (see Ebrahim, 2005; Lehtonen, 2005; Perrin, 1998), and the difficulties 
in identifying the appropriate level of performance measurement. There is a vivid discussion 
among academics and aid practitioners regarding the appropriate identification of indicators 
for accountability[3] (see Adam and Gunning, 2002; Adam et al., 2004; Foster, 2000). Most of the 
critics consider PM valuable as a kind of ‘early warning system’, which indicates whether output 
has indeed resulted in the intended outcome/impact (Booth and Lucas, 2002) but PM indicators 
should be distinguished from indicators which are used for aid allocation (Adam and Gunning, 
2002), because PM does not explain the causes behind the observed outcomes and outputs (Le-
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takes on board learning needs and includes an analysis of the reasons for achievement or non-
achievement of the stocks. Notwithstanding the value of the arguments, it remains important 
to acknowledge the inherent tensions when trying to reconcile both objectives of ‘accountabil-
ity’ and ‘learning’
5.3.   JSR as a forum for coordination and harmonisation  
The 1998 Review of OECD/DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assist-
ance pointed out that the principles in least compliance were collaboration among donors and 
the participation of recipients. Our review of AMs and our own JSR participation suggest that 
JSRs have the potential to turn the tide. They gather a broad range of stakeholders, including 
various government representatives, both from the sector and the finance ministry, national 
non-government actors, and budget and non-budget support donors. 
For budget support donors the rationale for participation in JSRs is obvious: as they 
shift from isolated projects to sector-wide support, it is no longer possible to attribute results 
directly to their inputs. For ‘project’ donors, the participation in JSRs is interesting as they gain 
insights into the sector they work in. Moreover, through their participation in the JSRs they get 
familiarised with this new M&E instrument, which is an important first step in the transition 
from individual M&E to joint M&E. For budget support donors the participation of project do-
nors and non-government actors is particularly interesting as they bring in information from 
the ‘ground’. Characteristic for budget support donors is that they often no longer operate at 
the local level, which cuts them off from local knowledge and realities. Whereas some JSRs also 
include field visits, in many cases JSRs take entirely place in the capital as visits to the field are 
often logistically complex, time-consuming and costly (see Packer, 2007). Information brought 
in by project donors and non-government actors may include e.g. participatory service delivery 
surveys, tracking studies, in-depth evaluations of pilot interventions, information on specific 
interventions in particular areas or target groups[1]. This does not only allow triangulation of in-
formation, it also functions as a ‘reality check’ on the information that is provided through con-
ventional management information system (MIS) and household surveys (Packer, 2007; OECD/
DAC, 2000). The use of information from non-government actors in the JSR process may also 
stimulate their own data collection activities and its quality (Ginsberg and Pane, 2005: 230). 
Improving the soundness of the JSRs is essential as a means to convince all in-
volved to gradually break down their stand-alone M&E systems or at least to design their M&E 
exercises in a way which enriches the overall JSR. Continuous parallel stand-alone missions (in-
cluding from budget support donors) add to the cost of ‘joint’ M&E processes, which are par-
ticularly high in the initial stages (see e.g. Martinez 2006). To decrease the costs of joint review 
processes, some (see e.g. Cassels, 1997) have suggested working with smaller missions, and/or 
experimenting with donor representation using other donors (‘silent partnerships’). Whereas 
all actors need not collectively participate in all different phases and dimensions of the JSRs, it 
is not certain that transaction costs for the recipient will be lessened when fewer actors par-
ticipate in the ‘joint’ processes. Given their own accountability needs to their constituencies, it 
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5.4.   JSR and feedback
Our own review shows that there has been little systematic follow-up on JSR rec-
ommendations. This lends support to some other studies (Martinez, 2006) which have raised 
similar concerns and indicated a failure to translate JSR conclusions and recommendations into 
policy-making, budgeting and implementation plans. This finding is indicative of a deficiency in 
the underlying institutional apparatus to address these systemic issues in the JSR. 
The organisational set-up of the JSR has, however, a number of attractive features 
to stimulate dissemination and influence of its findings. First, most JSRs are linked to an (A)RM 
where the conclusions and recommendations of the different working groups are brought to-
gether, discussed and adopted. As all stakeholders at the JSR participate in this forum, it is of-
ten labelled as painfully laborious and repetitive, involving too many people. Nevertheless, it 
potentially has a pay-off in terms of the dissemination of information and the influence[1] the 
M&E exercise can have. A joint review implies debate and dialogue which might in particular 
increase the process use of the evaluation[2]. It may create a shared understanding and might 
lead to changes in individual and collective thinking and behaviour which might eventually in-
duce changes in outcomes. It should be noted however, that quality of the input into the JSR, 
generally sector performance reports, should be satisfactory as to provide an incentive for de-
bate (Lehtonen, 2005). What is less clear is the degree of dissemination of the findings beyond 
those that directly participate at the JSR, towards the wider audience each of those participants 
represents. 
Second, JSRs are not generally stand-alone, one-shot events but part of a continu-
ous M&E process. They are based upon data collection that takes place throughout the year, in-
cluding information from MIS, non-government actors, additional commissioned studies on spe-
cific topics, etc.. At the same time the JSR feeds into this continuous process by indicating issues 
for follow-up and capacity-building, by indicating on which specific topics additional analyses or 
data collection is needed. The quality of the JSR depends to a certain extent upon the quality of 
the continuous M&E process and a high quality JSR also improves the continuous M&E process. 
A continuous M&E process also requires regular dialogue which in turn necessitates the pres-
ence of strong sector and M&E working groups (see also Packer, 2006; Cassels, 1997). 
Third, in many cases the JSR adopts an ‘expanded’ approach to M&E. An evaluabil-
ity assessment[3] of many sector programmes would indeed indicate that evaluative exercises 
should not yet be adopted as there is often no clear-cut sector programme with sound indica-
tors. However, the role of the review exercise is in many cases also to feed into the elaboration 
or at least improvement of the sector policy, strategies, plans and indicators. The insights from 
evaluability assessments are nevertheless interesting because they could help set an agenda of 
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6.	 ConClusIons
The 2005 Paris Declaration (PD) confronted both donors and recipients with an 
ambitious reform agenda. Recent follow-up surveys have revealed that M&E is one of the areas 
where implementation is lagging seriously behind. In sharp contrast to their own declarations, 
donors hardly harmonise and align with recipient systems or arrangements that are often non-
existent. This very reluctance however blocks at the same time the set-up and maturing of recip-
ient systems. To move beyond the current chicken-and-egg dilemma they are caught in, donors 
and recipients need to seek a middle way between the satisfaction of existing M&E needs in the 
short run and the building of recipient M&E frameworks in the longer run. 
This paper focuses on Joint Sector Reviews as potentially one interesting type of 
M&E exercises that might fill the gap. While JSRs are increasingly used on the ground and con-
sidered by practitioners as vital components of sector programmes, they have so far remained 
under-researched. Based on a combination of desk and field study, this paper analyses the extent 
to which JSRs in the education sectors of Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali effectively reconcile ob-
jectives of accountability and learning, while at the same time feed into the M&E reform agenda. 
Our stocktaking leads to a set of nuanced conclusions. The JSRs under study prioritise account-
ability over learning needs and mainly focus on implementation. When analysis is included, it is 
mostly of low quality and mainly dependent upon the analytical quality of the sector perform-
ance report, the main documentary input of the leading ministry. The lenient quality of these 
reports hints at the same time at the deficient quality of the underlying recipient M&E system or 
arrangements. In spite of these observed weaknesses, JSRs predominantly focus on sector ‘con-
tent’ issues to the detriment of institutional and systemic issues. While some JSRs underscore 
the importance of the underlying apparatus, none really engages in diagnostic assessment of 
the existing M&E system or arrangements. No targets are set regarding areas for improvement, 
there is no follow-up of recommendations nor is there a straightforward capacity building plan. 
Unsurprisingly, there is little maturing of the system and little effective donor alignment. 
On the positive side, JSRs score strongly on coordination, harmonisation, leader-
ship and broad-based participation, M&E principles that traditionally prove difficult to realise. 
JSRs are led by the sector ministry (alone or with the lead donor), bring together a broad variety 
of actors, make considerable efforts to coordinate and harmonise at the sector level and be-
tween the sector and the central level. While cross-reading among various data sources has so 
far remained underutilised, JSRs create a forum for information triangulation. This may improve 
validity of the exercises and enhance trust, which is particularly vital for those donors who are 
conventionally reluctant to align. Furthermore, JSRs also have a number of attractive organisa-
tional features to stimulate feedback: they are linked to an (annual) review meeting where con-
clusions and recommendations are discussed and negotiated, and they are generally integrated 
into a continuous process of follow-up and negotiation through sector working groups. 
In summation, JSRs have the potential to function as M&E exercises that reconcile 
short and longer-term objectives. To realize this, they particularly need to address, in the short 
run, longer-term systemic and institutional issues. While this may involve considerable addi-
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tional investment, it should lead to less laborious and complementary M&E exercises in the 
long run. Failure to do this risks institutionalising JSRs as parallel M&E exercises that hinder the 
further elaboration and maturing of the recipient sector M&E system. Instead they should be 
‘chameleon-like’, modifying their outlook to accommodate the changing status of the recipient’s 
M&E systems. 
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